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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-2049 
 
DIANA T. VISCO, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
 
On Appeal From the United States Tax Court 
(No. 97-23336) 
Tax Court Judge: Honorable Robert P. Ruwe 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 20, 2001 
 
Before: NYGAARD, MCKEE and GARTH, Circuit Judges . 
 
(Filed: February 13, 2002) 
 
 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM: 
 
Diana Visco appeals the United States Tax Court's 
decision sustaining the Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS") 
determination of a deficiency in Visco's 1992 Federal 
income tax.1 We will affirm the Tax Court's order for the 
reasons that follow. 
 
I. 
 
Visco was employed as a reading specialist for the 
Cheltenham Township School District (the "district") until 
1989.2 Visco was asked not to return to work in June of 
1989, and in August 1989 was suspended. The district's 
school board (the "board") voted to dismiss Visco in 
November 1989. Visco appealed this decision. The Secretary 
of Education for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
("Secretary") reversed the board's decision and ordered the 
district to reinstate Visco to the same or a comparable 
position and to award her back pay with interest for the 
years she was wrongfully dismissed. The board appealed, 
but the Secretary's order was affirmed by the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on June 3, 1991. 
Visco returned to employment at the district for the 1991- 
1992 school year, and was compensated for her work that 
year. She did not return to work after June 1992. 
 
In compliance with the Secretary's order, the district 
attempted to pay Visco her back pay for the 1989-90 and 
1990-91 school years. The district first issued two checks 
on February 25, 1992 representing salary for the two years, 
plus interest, less payroll deductions. Visco never cashed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Tax Court reversed the Commissioner's assessment of an addition 
to tax pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 6651(a)(1). The IRS does not challenge 
this ruling. 
 
2. Unless otherwise indicated, the factual history is taken from the 
"Findings of Fact" in the Tax Court's opinion. See Visco v. CIR, No. 
23336-97, slip op. (U.S.Tax.Ct. March 7, 2000). 
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these checks, and they were later voided by the district. On 
December 21, 1992, the district again issued Visco two 
checks, again for the back pay for the two school years, 
plus interest, less payroll deductions. These checks, along 
with a third for reimbursement for health benefits Visco 
had not received, were delivered by courier to Visco on 
December 28, 1992. She took the checks from the courier, 
telephoned the district's attorney to inform him she was 
refusing the checks, and then returned the checks to the 
courier. 
 
The district mailed Visco a Form W-2 for 1992, showing 
taxable income and withholdings for 1992. It reflected the 
salary she earned for 1992, plus the back pay she was 
issued. On April 15, 1993, Visco filed a Form 4868, 
"Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File U.S. 
Individual Income Tax Return." Visco then filed a Form 
4852, "Substitute for Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement 
of Form 1099R, Distributions from Pensions, Annuities, 
Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRA's, Insurance 
Contracts, etc." She filed this Form with the Criminal 
Investigation Unit of the IRS in June 1993. In her 
substitute Form W-2, Visco explained why she believed the 
district's W-2 was inaccurate: 
 
       (1) Money reported as earnings may actually be 
       monies illegally withheld from taxpayer's 
       retirement fund during the years of credited 
       service (1963-1992); 
 
       (2) If, money reported as earnings, constitute 
       employer contractual liability for wrongful 
       discharge of taxpayer, the amount entered is 
       inaccurate. . . . .; 
 
       (3) Monies issued to taxpayer identified as payroll 
       checks . . . dated December 21, 1992 are not 
       constructively received because they are 
       inaccurately identified as retirement salary. 
       Taxpayer has not filed for any application for 
       retirement allowance. Moreover, these checks serve 
       to validate a grossly inaccurate retirement fund. 
       Consequently, the taxpayer does not know how to 
       complete tax filing for the 1992 tax year and 
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       kindly requests a thorough investigation into this 
       matter. 
 
Visco v. CIR, at 6 (quoting Substitute form W-2) (footnotes 
omitted). Along with her substitute Form W-2, Visco 
submitted a letter requesting a criminal investigation into 
the matter, in which she stated that she wished to file her 
1992 tax return in a way which would allow her to preserve 
her legal rights. Visco then filed a Form 2688,"Application 
for Additional Extension of Time to File U.S. Individual 
Income Tax Return," explaining that she was waiting for 
information regarding her criminal investigation. 
 
After Visco's refusal of the two checks, the 
Commonwealth Court ordered the district to pay the total 
back pay, plus interest and less payroll deductions, to the 
Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court later 
opened a bank account with Dauphin Deposit Bank and 
Trust Co. for Visco's benefit, and notified Visco by letter 
that her back pay had been deposited in an interest bearing 
account. On August 28, 1997, the IRS mailed a statutory 
notice of deficiency to Visco for the taxable year 1992. 
 
Visco has neither attempted to access the fund in the 
Dauphin bank account, nor filed an income tax return for 
1992. 
 
II. 
 
The Tax Court determined that Visco's gross income for 
the taxable year 1992 included the paychecks she received 
and cashed for her work in the district in 1992 
($38,223.86). With respect to the back pay and interest 
thereon, Visco argued, in the alternative that (1) she never 
received these amounts; (2) the money was a damage award 
and not back pay; and (3) the income is an unauthorized 
withdrawal from her pension plan. The Tax Court 
concluded that Visco constructively received the back pay 
and interest on the back pay. Accordingly, the Tax Court 
determined that the back pay and interest on back pay 
must be included in Visco's 1992 gross income. 
 
III. 
 
On appeal, Visco raises three claims: (1) "[t]he chamber 
conference held on January 19, 1999, immediately prior to 
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the petitioner's bench trial culminated pre-trial practice 
governed by the court that unfairly restrained petitioner's 
discovery of respondent's case"; (2) "[t]he chamber 
conference held on January 19, 1999 immediately prior to 
the petitioner's bench trial culminated pre-trial practice 
governed by the court that unfairly restrained petitioner's 
development of her defense through substantive facts to be 
made a part of the required stipulation of fact;" and (3) 
"[t]he court committed plain error by entering findings and 
opinion of tax deficiency predicated on legally insufficient 
evidence and exclusion of substantive fact through trial 
governance that manifested an arbitrary application of 
motion in limine practice." 
 
Visco's first and second claims relate to pretrial practice, 
and are raised for the first time in this appeal. As these 
claims were not raised before the Tax Court, we will not 
consider them. Resyn Corp. v. United States, 851 F.2d 660, 
664 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U.S. 106, 
120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877 (1976). Further, as these claims 
were not preserved below, they have been waived. See 
Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehelm Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 
124, 139 (3d Cir. 2000). Visco was given the opportunity to 
object to the pre-trial procedures, specifically the adoption 
of the factual stipulations. She made no objections, but 
instead endorsed the proceedings. (Notes of Transcript ("Tr.")3 
at 3). 
 
Visco's final claim appears to allege that the Tax Court's 
opinion was based on insufficient evidence. This claim is 
belied by the record before us. There was ample evidence in 
the record to support the Tax Court's decision. The Tax 
Court's opinion thoroughly outlines why Visco's challenges 
fail under each of the alternative theories she presented. 
First, the Tax Court correctly found that Visco had 
constructively received the monies from the district. Visco 
argues that because she neither accepted nor cashed the 
checks from the district, and she failed to access the 
Dauphin Bank account, she never "received" the funds. "So 
long as the `income . . . is subject to a man's unfettered 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  Transcript of proceedings in United States Tax Court on Tuesday, 
January 19, 1999. 
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command and . . . he is free to enjoy [it] at his option[, it] 
may be taxed to him as income, whether he sees fit to enjoy 
it or not.' " Leavens v. CIR, 467 F.2d 809, 813 (3d Cir. 
1972) (quoting Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378, 50 
S.Ct. 336, 337 (1930)). There were no restrictions on the 
money when the district mailed Visco the checks or when 
they were delivered to her by courier. See Walter v. United 
States, 148 F.3d 1027, 1029 (8th Cir. 1998). Further, to 
access the Dauphin Bank account, Visco need only write a 
letter to the Commonwealth Court informing the court of 
her interest in accessing the money, and the court will 
notify the bank that Visco may receive the money. (Tr. at 
126). Visco had unfettered access to and control of the 
money; she just chose not to touch it. 
 
Visco also asserts that the money from the district is not 
back pay, but rather represents a settlement in a tort-like 
situation. We agree with the Tax Court that there is nothing 
in the record to support this claim. However, even if this 
were an accurate description of the circumstances, 
settlement funds would still be included in Visco's taxable 
income for 1992. See Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322, 
326 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that settlement agreements 
constitute gross income unless expressly excepted) 
(citations omitted). 
 
Finally, Visco alleges that the money from the district is 
not for back pay, but rather involved her retirement salary. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Visco's 
retirement fund is involved with these payments from the 
district, nor has she adequately explained her belief that 
retirement funds were involved in this transaction. The Tax 
Court correctly found this claim without merit. 
 
As the Tax Court noted, it appears that Visco had 
genuine concerns about the nature of her taxable income 
for the year 1992, and refrained from filing her income tax 
return until the matter could be resolved. Nevertheless, we 
agree with the Tax Court's conclusion that the payments of 
back pay, plus interest, were taxable income for 1992, and 
as such the deficiency determined by the IRS stands. 4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The total amount of Visco's deficiency for 1992 was determined to be 
$37,224. However, this is the total amount she owed for the year. The 
district withheld $35,134.61 in federal taxes from Visco's paychecks in 
1992. Visco then must only make a payment of the difference, $1,980 
(plus interest). 
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We will affirm the decision of the Tax Court. Visco's 
motion for correction or modification of the record pursuant 
to F.R.A.P. 10(e) is denied. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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